Re-examination of the Economic Interdependence between China and Japan by LU Longjiang
 
 
 
ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies Vol.11 (1) 2018 
 
 74 
 
 
Re-examination of the Economic Interdependence between 
China and Japan 
 
LU Longjiang1 
 
Abstract 
China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies. They have established one 
of the biggest bilateral trade relationships in the world and also is considered as close economic 
interdependence. However, tensions between these two countries have further escalated in recent 
years. Why economic interdependence cannot prevent the escalating tensions between China and 
Japan? This article tries to re-visit the theory of economic interdependence, in order to tackle the 
puzzle between economic interdependence and conflict in the case of Sino-Japanese relationship. I 
will demonstrate the key features on the development process of this economic interdependence 
relationship and show the dynamic change of increasingly obvious flaws in this relationship. In this 
context, I emphasize the necessity of establishing coordination mechanism between China and 
Japan, which can ease the anxiety of the two governments for the unfavorable situation brought by 
the worsening flaws in this economic interdependence. The Sino-Japanese relationship was 
seriously affected by these two factors: the increasingly obvious flaws on the one hand and the 
effort of both governments to build the coordination mechanism on the other hand, during the first 
decade of 21st century. These two factors working together have led to the repeated unstable 
situation between China and Japan in the 2000s. More importantly, the frustration with the 
establishment of the coordination mechanism in the case of Sino-Japanese relationship is the most 
important factor leads to the escalating current tensions. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Economic interdependence among the 
major powers has continued to reach new 
heights in  the context of the accelerated 
economic globalization. Scholars have 
provided numerous studies to prove the 
important role of economic interdependence in 
international relations. However, they have 
still not been able to determine whether 
economic interdependence leads to war or 
peace.  
The liberal scholars have argued that 
closer economic interdependence can reduce 
the possibility of military conflict. On the 
contrary, realist scholars believe that 
economic interdependence exacerbates the 
possibility of military conflict. In a new 
theoretical development, Dale 
Copland(Copeland, 2015) [1] proposed a 
theory that would draw an intermediate route 
between these contradictory assumptions. He 
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proposed the Trade Expectations Theory and 
argued that states’ expectation of future trade 
and investment environment determines 
whether economic interdependence can lead to 
peace or war.  
This paper re-visits the theory of 
economic interdependence by searching for a 
suitable theoretical explanation for the current 
Sino-Japanese relationship. China and Japan 
are the world’s second and third largest 
economies and this bilateral relationship 
evidences considerable economic 
interdependence. However, tensions between 
these two countries have further escalated in 
recent years. The Sino-Japanese relationship is 
a good case to reconsider the limitations of 
previous theories and further contribute to the 
development of the existing theoretical 
discussion. 
Since China and Japan achieved the 
normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, 
the two countries have carried out fruitful 
cooperation in the economic field. They have 
established one of the world’s biggest bilateral 
trade relationships. The size of bilateral trade 
reached a record of US $34.494 billion in 
2011. Until 2014, this bilateral trade was 
ranked the third-largest in the world (Drysdale,  
2015) [2]. The relationship between China and 
Japan has long been described as 
economically interdependent. Not only 
scholars but also the official website of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan described 
the economic relationship between China and 
Japan as closely interdependent(Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan [MOFA], 2016) [3]. 
Meanwhile, the Sino-Japanese 
relationship has entailed historical problems of 
the war and colonialism as well as realistic 
territorial disputes. In the 2000s, even when 
the economic and trade relationship between 
China and Japan was developing rapidly, the 
political tensions also exacerbated repeatedly 
in multiple issues, such as the controversy 
concerning history textbooks, Japanese prime 
ministers’ visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
political speeches by politicians, and drilling 
oil and gas fields in the disputed area. More 
seriously, due to the escalating tensions in 
maritime and security issues, the political 
opposition between China and Japan has 
become increasingly serious in recent years. 
The frequent confrontations of the official 
vessels in the disputed waters and of the China 
Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense 
Force [JASDF] on the high seas, amidst the 
absence of a maritime security liaison 
mechanism. In 2016, the number of 
emergency takeoffs of JASDF reached a new 
record, and more than 70% were considered to 
be against the China Air Force (JASDF, 2017) 
[4]. The highly-intensive interception greatly 
increases the likelihood of incidents. For 
example the JASDF fighters once launched 
chaff(interference countermeasure) to the 
Chinese air fighters on the high seas in 2016 
(Ministry of National Defense of the People's 
Republic of China, 2016) [5]. 
Thus, China and Japan have the so-called 
close economic interdependence on the one 
hand, yet they also have the increasing 
tensions of the security situation with the 
possibility of military conflict on the other. 
Why economic interdependence cannot 
prevent the escalating tensions between China 
and Japan? In order to answer this question, 
this work will demonstrate the dynamic of this 
relationship, and reconsider the theory of 
economic interdependence and conflict. By 
re-examining the economic interdependence 
between China and Japan, I will argue that the 
huge amount of profit in the economic 
interdependence between China and Japan is 
insufficient to provide positive expectation for 
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the two governments in this relationship. Two 
other factors, the increasingly obvious flaws 
and the changing coordination mechanism, 
play an extremely important role in affecting 
governments’ expectations in the case of 
Sino-Japanese relationship. This explanation 
is proposed as a complement to existing 
theories, which is helpful for further 
explaining the policy changes in other major 
power relations in the context of accelerating 
globalization. 
The argument is supported by personal 
interviews and secondary sources. I conducted 
interviews with key people, such as diplomats, 
current and former government officials, 
managers of Japanese companies in China, as 
well as those who have a long-term 
commitment to nongovernmental cultural 
exchanges. 
In the next section, I will reconsider the 
previous studies of the relationship between 
economic interdependence and conflict and 
propose my hypothesis. In the third section, I 
will re-examine the economic interdependence 
between China and Japan, and illustrate the 
dynamics of this relationship. In particular, I 
will show that the increasingly obvious flaws 
of this economic interdependence and the 
frustration concerning the coordination 
mechanism. The last section will summarize 
the main findings.  
 
II. Previous studies and theoretical 
modifications 
 
When it comes to the concept of 
economic interdependence, we have to go 
back to the origin of this concept. Regarding 
to the changing trends in the 1960’s among 
the industrialized European countries, Richard 
N. Cooper proposed that there is sensitivity in 
the relationship between domestic economy 
and the international economies. This is the 
‘economic interdependence’ relationship. In 
the context of economic interdependence, “to 
give up some of the national autonomy in 
order to enjoy the benefits by closer 
international economic relations”(Cooper, 
1968) [6] will form mutual restraint between 
interdependent states and also increase the 
space for mutual compromise. 
Edward L. Morse further introduces this 
theory into the field of international relations. 
He believes that under the impetus of 
modernization, economic interdependence 
will have three impacts. First, the borders 
between domestic and foreign affairs will 
dissolve. Second, the distinction between high 
politics and low politics will be less important. 
Third, the ability of state leaders to have 
political control will decrease with the 
growing interdependence (Morse, 1973) [7]. 
He also believes that under the wave of 
modernization, international relations will 
further accelerate the transformation. Under 
economic interdependence, the competition 
among countries will change from a zero-sum 
game to a win-win game, and the separation of 
a country's commercial and national security 
policies will no longer be realistic(Morse, 
1976) [8]. 
Both Cooper and Morse believe that the 
new changes in the international relations will 
weaken sovereignty and reduce the possibility 
of conflict between states. However, after 
their proposal, the debate over the relationship 
between economic interdependence and the 
major power conflicts continues. The debate 
can be mainly divided into two main camps: 
the liberal and realist theories. 
The existing theories both have their own 
characteristics and disadvantages in 
explaining different cases of international 
relations. In the case of the contemporary 
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Sino-Japanese relationship, existing theories 
cannot provide a logical coherent explanation. 
This section points out the limitations of the 
existing theories and will modify them. This 
will become the theoretical basis for the 
subsequent sections to explain the case of 
Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
1. Theories of economic interdependence 
and conflict  
As mentioned previously, studies of the 
relationship between economic 
interdependence and conflict in international 
relation theory have been mainly proposed by 
liberal and realist scholars. In fact, there have 
been a large number of empirical studies. 
They all found cases that could support their 
arguments. However, no single theory can 
perfectly explain all cases because some cases 
do not fit certain theoretical explanations. 
Liberalists believe that military power is 
not the most critical factor in international 
relations. They put forward another concept of 
power based on the asymmetric dependency 
between countries. The concept of asymmetric 
interdependence came from one of the most 
famous books in liberal understanding of 
economic interdependence, Power and 
Interdependence, written by Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye in 1977. In this book, 
Keohane and Nye argue against the idea of 
realism, which considers military security as a 
state’s most important priority. Instead, they 
proposed the concept of “Complex 
Interdependence”. Complex Interdependence 
has three characteristics: multi-channel of 
linkages between countries, absence of 
hierarchy among diplomatic issues, and the 
minor role of the military force (Keohane & 
Nye, 1977) [9]. 
All in all, the idea of liberalism can be 
summarized as this: any state in 
interdependence will seek to avoid war and 
maximize its benefits of close ties from 
peaceful trading because trade provides 
benefits while war causes economic loss. 
Keohane and Nye’s idea of asymmetric 
interdependence showed a gap of power 
between the more dependent state and the less 
dependent state. Namely, more dependent 
states are likely to enjoy peace while less 
dependent states are tend to be aggressive to 
make other states concede. At the same time, 
even less dependent states need to consider the 
opportunity cost, especially when other states 
are signaling that they are willing to suffer the 
higher cost. Therefore, less dependent states 
will not push too hard in negotiations. With 
this prediction, liberalists believe that 
interdependence should lower the risk of war. 
They explained some cases in the history, 
such as the 1967-1978 period during the Cold 
War (Gasiorowski & Polachek , 1982) [10] or 
the First World War (Gartzke & Lupu, 2011 
[11]; Gartzke & Lupu, 2012 [12]) to support 
their hypothesis. 
The realist argument is completely 
opposite to the liberalist one. Realists firmly 
believe that the international community is an 
anarchy. Therefore they assert that 
interdependence will only increase the 
chances of conflict. Based on this idea, they 
argue that the country's first priority lies in its 
own security (Grieco, 1988 [13]; Mearsheimer, 
1995 [14]). Realists have highlighted the risk 
of a state being cut-off from important 
markets and raw materials, and restructuring 
of economic relation that may bring huge 
costs (Waltz, 1979) [15]. Under this premise, 
they insist that higher interdependence creates 
higher uncertainty that may push the great 
powers into war and conflict2. According to 
them, when states realize that they are caught 
in interdependence, they will seek 
 
 
 
ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies Vol.11 (1) 2018 
 
 78 
opportunities to reduce dependency, even by 
conflict and war. Realists identified cases in 
history that can support their hypothesis, for 
example, the First Opium War between 
Britain and China. 
Both camps have carried out numerous 
studies of empirical analysis with different 
cases. These results show that both liberalist 
and realist theory have their respective 
strengths in explaining the relationship 
between economic interdependence and 
conflict in different cases. However both 
liberalists and realists have shown their 
weakness in the interpretation of cases that do 
not meet their predictions. Liberalists cannot 
explain that why radical policy changes still 
happen even when two countries have huge 
common commercial interests. On the other 
hand, realists cannot explain that why 
countries will form economic interdependence 
and ignore the risk of uncertainty. This is due 
to the theoretical disadvantage that exists in 
the interpretation of both liberal and realist 
predictions, which is that their view of 
economic interdependence is just a snapshot 
in time and thus ignores the dynamic changes 
between the economy and international 
relations. Neither liberal or realist theory were 
designed to tackle the case of the 
Sino-Japanese relationship, but this theoretical 
disadvantage has led to the inability to explain 
the situation between China and Japan. 
The situation between China and Japan 
shows that liberal prediction does not apply to 
the current situation. At least in the 2000s, 
economic and trade exchanges between China 
and Japan experienced rapid growth, however 
tensions between the two countries have not 
eased. The political tension and the close 
economy formed a very famous dichotomy, 
namely, the ‘Cold Politics and Hot Economy’3. 
After a territorial dispute broke out in 2012, 
the tense relationship became even worse. The 
relations between China and Japan plunged 
into a long and multi-field antagonistic period, 
which had not happened since their relations 
had resumed in 1972. 
On the other hand, the realist prediction 
cannot provide a logical coherent explanation 
for the case between China and Japan either. 
For example, realist prediction seems to align 
with the situation during the Cold Politics and 
Hot Economy period, however, this is 
completely incompatible with the situation in 
the 1980s when the two countries enjoyed 
increasing economic interdependence and also 
a close political relationship. Realism also 
cannot explain why China and Japan were 
willing to take the risk of vulnerability that 
accompanies deepening dependence in the 
first place. In their predictions, China should 
have not given up on its autarkic policies, but 
nonetheless, it entered the international market 
in 1979. 
 
2. The trade expectations theory and the 
reality 
Dale Copeland provided a better 
approach to explain the relationship between 
economic interdependence and great power 
conflicts from a dynamic perspective. In 
contrast to both liberalism and realism 
predictions, Copeland4 argues that economic 
interdependence actually can lead to either 
peace or war. In his argument, what really 
matters to the relationship between 
interdependence and war is the future 
expectations of the trade and investment 
environment between states. Copeland argues 
that, “liberals are right to assert that trade 
and investment flows can raise the opportunity 
cost of going to war…realists are correct in 
their claim that commercial ties make states 
vulnerable to cutoffs…”5. He combined these 
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two reasonable assumptions of the different 
theories to argue that states go to war because 
of falling expectations that will make them 
pessimistic about their long-term security 
prospects. Through this logic, Copeland 
overcome the gap between liberal and realist 
theory, and links economic factors with 
national security. 
According to the theory, expectations for 
the trade and investment environment are not 
based on a certain point of time, but rather on 
the expectation of future trends that will affect 
policy changes. Even though trade and 
investment between two countries are working 
well in the current circumstances, if a 
government expects that the current system 
will lead to unfavorable conditions, then 
policy changes will be an inevitable choice. 
Therefore, Copeland successfully avoided 
looking at just a snapshot of the dynamic 
changes between economy and international 
relations. More importantly, Copeland 
elaborated on the critical effects of sustained 
economic prosperity to the stability of the 
regime. When the governments expected 
long-term economic recession is approaching 
in their economic interdependence, then 
having policy change will be a reasonable 
choice to prevent the occurrence of 
unfavorable circumstances. 
However, Copeland's theory cannot 
explain why the positive expectation of the 
trade and investment environment did not 
prevent the escalating tensions in case of 
Sino-Japanese relationship. This is because 
only looking at the trade and investment 
environment is not enough to draw the whole 
picture of the economic interdependence in 
the context of the accelerated globalization 
process.  
Applying Copeland’s theory, we can 
identify extremely positive expectations for 
the trade and investment environment between 
China and Japan at least in the first decade of 
the 21st century. According to the annual 
reports of the Japan Bank of International 
Cooperation [JBIC], China has been the most 
promising overseas investment market for 
Japanese companies since the 1990s (JBIC, 
2012) [16]. Even after the territorial disputes in 
September 2012, JBIC’s emergency survey 
showed that China was still the most popular 
overseas investment destination for Japanese 
companies (JBIC, 2013) [17]. Likewise, 
positive expectations expressed in the annual 
reports of Japan External Trade Organization 
[JETRO] were also very impressive. In the 
first decade of the 2000s, the trade between 
China and Japan maintained rapid growth 
(JETRO, 2011) [18]. JETRO’s reports show 
very positive expectations for the China-Japan 
trade situation even in the report published in 
2013, when a sudden fall of trade volume 
happened in the previous year. This report 
predicted that the China-Japan trade volume 
would be higher than 2011 and create a new 
record (JETRO, 2013) [19]. Such optimistic 
trade expectations can also be found in the 
annual reports of the Ministry of Commerce of 
the People 's Republic of China [MOFCOM] 
(MOFCOM, 2004 [20]; MOFCOM, 2006 
[21]). 
However, the optimistic expectations did 
not meet the reality. Obviously, Copeland’s 
theory already cannot explain the changing 
situations since 2000s’. Contrary to the 
prediction of the trade expectations theory, 
China and Japan have been caught in a hostile 
spiral. And such a situation even with 
worsening tensions since 2012. 
There are two reasons for this gap. Firstly, 
Copeland did not include any cases after the 
end of the Cold War to demonstrate his theory. 
After the end of the Cold War, the 
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acceleration of globalization had further 
expanded requirements of economic 
interdependence beyond trade and investment. 
Secondly, the characteristic of the 
Sino-Japanese economic interdependence is 
not as strong as many people have thought. 
Despite the huge profits from trade and 
investment, the flaws of this relationship are 
also becoming more and more prominent. 
 
3. Proposed theoretical modifications 
I argue that the increasingly obvious 
flaws as well as the frustration with the 
establishment of the coordination mechanism 
between China and Japan, are the most 
important factors that affect the future 
expectations of economic interdependence 
between governments. 
Profit is the driving force for countries to 
establish the economic interdependence 
relationship. The gain from profit in the 
economic interdependence is equivalent to its 
loss when the economic cut-off occurs. If the 
gain from profit falls, and then turns into a 
long recession in the economic 
interdependence between major powers, the 
economic prosperity and stability of the 
regimes will be seriously affected. Therefore, 
profit emphasizes sustainability. However, 
there are two factors that have negative 
impacts on the sustainability of profits in the 
relationship between China and Japan. 
I define flaw as negative trends of the 
economic interdependence relationship which 
may cause recession in the future. Although 
the economic interdependence between China 
and Japan seems to be very beneficial for both 
countries, there are actually four flaws in this 
economic interdependent relationship. Firstly, 
strategic resources in the trade goods are 
absent. Secondly, main trade goods are 
replaceable by third parties. Thirdly, 
investment costs in the Chinese market are on 
the rise. Finally, China's amount of investment 
in Japan is very small. These flaws in the 
economic interdependence between the two 
countries have increasingly become more 
obvious since the late 90s due to the economic 
development. At the existence of the flaws 
does not necessarily cause recession, flaws do 
not prompt the time or the intensity of a 
recession’s occurrence. However, 
governments cannot ignore this risk, 
especially when they have huge profit from 
economic interdependence. The increasingly 
obvious flaws continue to amplify the 
possibility of recession, which promotes 
negative expectations for the two 
governments. 
Coordination mechanism is a new 
requirement for economic interdependence in 
the context of accelerated economic 
globalization. The purpose of establishing the 
coordination mechanism is to jointly resist the 
risks, and further assist each other in order to 
shorten the recession if it happens. 
Coordination mechanism includes currency 
swap agreement, tariffs and trade agreements, 
regional economic integration and other 
financial and monetary cooperation. In 
addition to the flaws in economic 
interdependence, external factors such as 
global or regional financial crises can also 
increase the risk of economic recession. 
Although the monetary cooperation does not 
guarantee to overcome this risk, it can greatly 
ease the fear of recessions for governments. 
On the other hand, frustration in the 
establishment of coordination mechanism will 
exacerbate the trepidation between 
governments, especially when the economic 
interdependence itself has obvious flaws. I 
argue this is the situation between China and 
Japan. 
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In the next section, I will demonstrate 
this argument with concrete data and point out 
that two governments have failed to both 
overcome the flaws and deepen the 
coordination mechanism in this relationship. 
 
III. Economic Interdependence between 
China and Japan 
 
1. The development of this economic 
interdependence 
The concept of economic 
interdependence has been widely used to 
describe the Sino-Japanese relationship in 
academia. As mentioned previously, even the 
Japanese government's official statement 
about this relationship mentions the close 
economic interdependence. However, scholars 
have scarcely demonstrated the development 
process of this economic interdependence 
relationship. 
Although we evaluated this economic 
interdependence between China and Japan as 
close, this relationship actually went through a 
long and complicated process of development. 
China and Japan have had a long history 
of commercial exchange. However, after the 
founding of the People's Republic of China, 
the disruption of official contracts between 
Japan and the Chinese mainland resulted in a 
period where trade was cut-off. In 1951, the 
two countries have gradually started in the 
form of non-official trade, in order to rebuild 
their trade relationship. After four civil trade 
agreements and the semi-official LT Trade6, 
China and Japan were making economic 
preparations for the political recovery of their 
diplomatic relations. In 1965, Japan became 
the largest trading partner of the People’s 
Republic of China for the first time (Tanaka, 
1991) [22]. The trade volume between China 
and Japan was not large at that time, which 
was only US $46.97 million. This figure, 
however, reached US $110 million in 1972 
when China and Japan successfully achieved 
the normalization of diplomatic relations. That 
is, the figure increased to more than double, 
which showed great potential for its future 
development. This fact provides a strong 
motivation for both governments to seek 
higher profit in this relationship. 
The development of the Sino-Japanese 
relationship has further met this demand. The 
Twelfth National Convention of the Chinese 
Communist Party was held in September 1978, 
and decided to implement the ‘Reform and 
Opening-up’ policy. This huge potential 
market finally opened its door to the world. 
However the lack of advanced technology and 
capital was the biggest problem China faced in 
its development. In December 1978, 
Masayoshi Ohira became the Prime Minister 
of Japan. Ohira attached great importance to 
Sino-Japanese relationship, as he repeatedly 
expressed, and to also deepening the 
friendship between Japan and China, which 
was viewed as important for the maintenance 
of peace in Asia and the world (Song & Tian, 
2010) [23]. Therefore, their policy on China 
became one of the most important diplomatic 
issues for Japan. 
On December 5, 1979, Ohira made an 
official visit to China. Before his trip, the 
commercial relationship between Japan and 
China had undergone rapid development in a 
short time. The large commercial negotiations 
represented by Baoshan Iron and Steel Plant in 
Shanghai had a contract of more than US $5 
billion with a Japanese company for 
exportation of equipments to China. However, 
Chinese companies did not have enough 
strength to withstand such big contracts at that 
time, which meant that US $2.7 billion of this 
contract could not be fulfilled7. This made 
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many Japanese companies worried and 
doubtful about whether China's reform and 
opening-up could be sustained or not. In 
response, the Japanese Prime Minister pledged 
official development aid [ODA] during his 
visit. As one of the most important policies for 
China’s economic development, the Japanese 
ODA became the first foreign loan for the 
People's Republic of China, which supported 
the implementation of China's reform and 
opening-up in the context where China was 
lacking capital. On the other hand, China's 
ongoing reform and opening-up also provides 
a guarantee for sustainable gain of profit in 
this economic interdependence relationship.  
Data of the trade between China and 
Japan supported the optimistic expectations of 
both governments. In 1980, the next year in 
which Japan gave ODA to China, the trade 
volume reached US $940.17 million. Until 
1985, 6% of Japan’s total foreign trade was 
with China. Japan is the nearest developed 
country to China, so China-Japan trade itself 
has a geographical advantage due to low 
transportation costs. 
Furthermore, if we look at the trade 
category of products during this period 
between China and Japan, it was highly 
complementary. China exported raw materials 
to Japan and imported industrial products and 
machinery from Japan, which became one of 
the key characteristics of this relationship. 
This characteristic of China-Japan trade has 
existed up until now, which is the most 
prominent feature compared to China’s other 
trading partners8. 
Meanwhile, China has decided to adopt a 
more open policy in several coastal cities 
during the same period. China welcomed and 
gave preferential treatment to the investment 
of Japanese entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the 
Chinese government agreed to cooperate with 
Japanese companies in the development of 
coal, oil, and non-ferrous and rare metals in 
south-west and north-west China (People's 
Daily, 1984) [24]. The support from both 
governments gave Japanese companies and 
the financial community confidence to invest 
in China. In fact, the number of Japanese 
investment projects in China increased by 
109.7% and the actual amount of capital 
increased by 136% in 1988, which is the same 
year that Japanese Prime Minister Noboru 
Takeshita visited China and signed the 
Agreement on the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between 
the two countries. By the end of 1991, a total 
of 1995 Japanese companies invested in China 
with contracts totaling US $4.124 billion9. 
From the performance of trade and 
investment between China and Japan during 
this period, we can confirm the appearance of 
economic interdependence or, at the very least, 
they had began to enter an economic 
interdependence relationship. The rapid 
growth of profit in the early stages of this 
relationship provided a positive expectation of 
the future, which made the two governments 
more inclined to maintain the existing 
policies.  
One of the very best examples to show 
this impact of the economic interdependence 
was the governments’ behavior was when 
western countries launched economic 
sanctions against China in 1989. In June 1989, 
the United States and major European 
countries began to impose sanctions on China. 
However, the profit gains in the economic 
interdependence between China and Japan 
was rapidly growing in this period, and 
therefore, Japan did not want to join the ranks 
of sanctions against China. Japanese Prime 
Minister Sōsuke Uno said on June 6 that if 
China was isolated by sanctions, as a 
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neighboring country Japan would also feel 
anxiety10. On June 13, the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry made a statement on the Japanese 
ODA to China, and said that the aid it 
committed to China's development was 
separate from the humanitarian issues. On 
August 29, while attending the international 
conference on Cambodian issues, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama met with the 
Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu 
Shuqing in Liu’s hotel room. Nakayama said 
to Liu, "I hope the Chinese government 
understands that Japan-China relations are 
different from the relations with other western 
countries."11 Liu also invited Nakayama to 
visit China immediately. In addition, when 
Deng Xiaoping met with the delegation of the 
Japan-China Friendship Parliamentary Union 
on September 19, he said, “China noticed 
Japan’s attitude towards China in the G7 
meeting was different to other countries” 
(Tian, 1997) [25]. The Japanese government 
was quite reluctant to impose sanctions on 
China, although eventually joined other 
countries in doing this, but it did not last for 
long. The economic interdependence between 
China and Japan indeed greatly affected the 
governments’ behavior in how they dealt with 
relations with the other country. 
With the further development of 
economic interdependence between China and 
Japan, the huge trade volume between China 
and Japan became another characteristic of 
this relationship. Throughout the 1990s, the 
trade between China and Japan grew from US 
$12.92 billion in 1990 to US $81.37 billion in 
2000. From 1992 to 2003, Japan has always 
been China's largest trading partner 
(MOFCOM, 2004) [26]. In 2002, China 
overtook the United States as the largest 
import country for Japan. In 2007, China 
became Japan's largest trading partner. In 
2009, China surpassed the United States as the 
largest export country for Japan as well, which 
truly became the largest trading nation with 
Japan in the world (JETRO, 2010[27]; JETRO, 
2006 [28]). Sino-Japanese trade reached the 
highest record in history of US $34.494 billion 
in 2011. The trade volume between China and 
Japan increased by more than 360 times in 30 
years. 
On the other hand, Japan's investment in 
China was also growing rapidly in this period. 
After a period of rapid growth in the first half 
of the 1990s, Japan's investment in China was 
very briefly affected by the Asian financial 
crisis. After entering the 21st century however, 
Japan's investment in China recovered. From 
2001 to 2010, China was among the top six of 
Japan's foreign investment destination 
countries (Graph 1).  
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Graph 1. Japan's investment in China and ranking in Japan's foreign investment 2001-2010            
Unit: US $million 
 
Source: JETOR. 
 
As mentioned previously, Japanese 
companies had very high expectations for the 
Chinese market because China has always 
been the most favored destination country of 
Japanese investment in the last decade. In a 
2010 survey, 87.8% of the Japanese 
enterprises invested in China valued the future 
growth of the Chinese market (JETRO, 2011) 
[29].  
Not only is the Chinese market very 
attractive for Japanese companies, but 
Japanese companies have also provided help 
to China in two aspects. On the one hand, 
Japanese companies invest and build factories 
in China, which is providing a large number of 
jobs. Take the Toyota Motor Corporation as 
an example. Up to 2015, the Toyota Motor 
Corporation invested in 10 factories in 
mainland China and hired more than 40,000 
employees (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2016) 
[30]. According to MOFA data, until the end 
of 2012, a total of 23,094 Japanese companies 
have invested in China, which was the largest 
number compared to the other countries 
investing in China (MOFA, 2016) [31]. On the 
other hand, Japanese companies that invest 
and build factories in China also have 
stimulated China's foreign exports. Take 
manufacturing as an example. After 2000, 
Japanese companies’ investment in China 
appeared more in the transport machinery, 
motor and machinery industries. Japanese 
investment in transport machinery in 2002 
was only US $194 million, but by 2004 it had 
soared to US $1.617 billion. That is, the 
structure of China's exports to Japan had 
undergone tremendous changes too. In the 
early 1990s, the export goods from China to 
Japan were mainly food, raw materials and 
clothing. However, in 2005, machinery 
exported to Japan alone reached more than 
$44 billion, accounting for 40.8% of China's 
total exports to Japan (JETRO, 2006) [32].  
However, into the 2000s, the 
Sino-Japanese relationship has caught in the 
5
6
3 3
2
4
3
5
4
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Investment
Rank
 
 
 
ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies Vol.11 (1) 2018 
 
 85 
Cold Politics and Hot Economy situation. 
Despite the interdependence between China 
and Japan, positive expectations seem to have 
played a positive role only in the early stages 
of this relationship. On the one hand, in the 
development process of the economic 
interdependence relationship between China 
and Japan, four flaws of this relationship have 
become increasingly evident. On the other 
hand, as economic globalization has entered a 
new stage, the economic interdependence has 
become multi-facet. I will continue to 
demonstrate this change in order to uncover 
the reason for the escalating tensions between 
China and Japan. 
 
2. Flaws of this economic interdependence 
There are four flaws in both the trade and 
investment aspects of this relationship, which 
are: (1) the absence of strategic resources in 
the trade goods between China and Japan, (2) 
the main trade goods between China and 
Japan are replaceable by third parties, (3) 
investment costs in the Chinese market are on 
the rise, and (4) China's amount of investment 
in Japan is very small. 
These flaws did not emerge in recent 
years, but rather have existed since the 
beginning of this economic interdependence 
relationship. With the continuous development 
of this relationship, these flaws are also 
getting more and more obvious. Fixing these 
flaws, however, would be almost impossible 
in a short period of time. The profit from the 
economic interdependence continues to reach 
new heights, however, the increasingly 
obvious flaws have highlighted the possibility 
of recession. 
The first flaw is that the trade of goods 
between China and Japan have an absence of 
strategic resources.  
Strategic resources place emphasis on 
scarcity and non-renewability compared to 
other kinds of resources, for example, oil and 
minerals (Gao & Zhao, 2012) [33]. Japan itself 
has a lack of natural oil and mineral resources, 
so it is highly dependent on their import. If 
these strategic resources are cut-off, then the 
Japanese economy would suffer a heavy blow. 
For example, Japan's GDP growth in 1973 
was 8.0%, but experienced negative growth 
due to the first oil crisis in 1974 (Institute of 
Japan Study of Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, 2008) [34]. In order to rid the 
negative impact from the oil crisis, Japan even 
had to follow the requirements placed upon it 
by Arab countries and thus re-adjusted its 
policy on Israel (Li, 2003) [35]. 
After the oil crisis, Japan has always 
been very concerned about its import strategic 
resource channels. Four of Japan's first six 
ODA projects in China were related to energy 
transport constructions. In 1978, China and 
Japan signed the China-Japan long-term trade 
agreement, which required China to export a 
total of US $10 billion worth of crude oil and 
coal to Japan over the next eight years (Lin, 
1990) [36]. The agreement was last renewed in 
2001, where China's exports to Japan would 
still just be crude oil and coal in this 
agreement (MOFCOM, 2002) [37]. 
On the other hand, since 2003, China's 
annual oil consumption surpassed Japan (BP, 
2008) [38]. As China's energy demand grew, it 
was no longer feasible for China to continue 
exporting oil to Japan. Therefore, the 
China-Japan long-term trade agreement was 
ended in 2005. Not only that, but the energy 
competition between China and Japan was 
also surfaced in this period. Especially during 
Russian Far East Oil Pipeline project, the 
competition between China and Japan has 
created a discord in the relations between the 
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two countries. Therefore, the lack of strategic 
resources in the trade goods between China 
and Japan is one of the flaws that cannot be 
easily offset. 
The second flaw is that the main trade 
goods between China and Japan are 
replaceable by third parties.  
In recent years, the proportion of 
electronic products in China's exports to Japan 
continues to increase, but low-value-added 
goods, especially the proportion of textiles and 
daily necessities, is still large. With the rising 
labor cost in China and the investment of 
Japanese companies in other developing 
countries, the competitiveness of 
low-value-added commodities made in China 
will decline. Even in extreme cases, when 
Japan lost import channels from China, there 
are still other countries, such as Vietnam and 
Bangladesh, that could easily replace China 
after a period of time. 
While Japan's exports to China are 
mainly high-value-added products, but with 
China's reform and opening-up, the channels 
for China to access the international market 
are also increasing. For instance, in 2016, the 
top three largest categories of goods Japan 
exported to China were electronics, chemical 
products and transportation equipment. It is 
also the top three categories of German 
exports to China. The trade volume between 
Germany and China was only about 60% of 
Sino-Japanese trade in 2016, but the trade 
volume of the top three categories of goods 
that Germany exported to China has already 
became quite close to Japan's exports (Graph 
2). While in 2005, these three categories of 
German goods exported to China was only 
one-tenth of the volume exported in 2016 
(MOFCOM, 2006) [39]. 
 
 
Graph 2. Top three categories of trade goods that Japan and Germany exported to China in 
2016  
Unit: US $million 
 
Source: Trade Report 2016 from MOFCOM.
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Such changes are the inevitable result of 
China's economic development. On the one 
hand, China needs to upgrade its industries. 
Sooner or later, China will not be one of the 
largest producers in the low value-added 
commodities marker. Nowadays, some 
Chinese enterprises already have the ability to 
produce some high-value-added commodities. 
On the other hand, China has more and more 
trading partners compare to the early stage of 
its reform and opening-up. Japan is no longer 
the only choice for China. Not only Germany, 
but South Korea, the United States and other 
countries are competing with Japan to win the 
Chinese market. Therefore, in the foreseeable 
future, this flaw in the Sino-Japanese 
economic interdependence will not be solved, 
but rather it will be further exacerbated. 
The third flaw of this economic 
interdependence is also related to the 
economic development in China. The 
difficulties facing Japanese companies, 
especially for manufacturing companies to 
have large-scale investments in the Chinese 
market, have been greatly increasing. 
Even though China has always been one 
of the most valued overseas markets for 
Japanese companies, when I interviewed key 
people from Japanese enterprises, I got a 
slightly contradictory answer. That is, the best 
opportunity for Japanese companies to invest 
in China has already passed (Anonymous, 
personal communication, 2015 & 2016) [40]. 
Japanese multinational companies have 
long-term plans for investing in China. In one 
of my interviews, a China regional manager of 
a major Japanese car company said that the 
time for Japanese automobile manufacturers to 
invest large-scale in the Chinese market has 
happened already (Anonymous, personal 
communication, 2016) [41]. China's labor costs 
have recently risen at a rate of 20-25% per 
year (Zhang & Li, 2015) [42]. Hence, Japanese 
companies will seek other overseas investment 
destinations in order to control operating costs. 
Therefore, maintaining steady low growth has 
become the main goal, especially for the 
Japanese manufacturing industry in China. 
The fourth flaw is the proportion of 
investment between China and Japan is very 
uneven as China's amount of investment into 
Japan is very small.  
Needless to mention the importance of 
Japanese companies to invest in China, but 
despite the share of Japan’s investment in 
China declining in recent years, it is still one 
of the most important overseas investors for 
China. In contrast, China's investment in 
Japan can be described as insignificant. 
According to the information published by 
JETRO in 2016, China's earliest recorded 
investment in Japan was 1988, when the total 
investment in Japan amounted to US $2 
million. This amount of investment has not 
changed significantly even into the 21st 
century (Table 1). In general, China's 
investment in Japan is far less than the US 
investment in Japan, and even less than South 
Korea or Taiwan's investment in Japan. 
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Table 1. China’s direct investment in Japan after 2000                  Unit: US $million  
Year 
 
Region   
2000 2001 2002 200
3 
2004 200
5 
200
6 
2007 2008 2009 2010 …  2015 
China  0 2 1 -2 -9 11 12 15 37 -137 314 …  554 
Taiwan  296 164 -24 80 74 -26 110 36 66 57 21 …  606 
Korea  48 38 63 -101 251 31 108 221 279 255 274 …  823 
US  -1052 3492 2451 -641 1407 308 105 13270 11792 1831 2961 … 5194 
Source: JETRO.  
 
If we look at the total overseas investment 
from China, we will get better picture of the 
situation. For example, in 2015 China's overseas 
investment hit a record high of US $145.67 billion, 
accounting for 9.9% of the global investment 
share. This makes China the world's second 
largest investor after the United States. However, 
China's investment in Japan only accounted for 
0.3% of China's total overseas investment in 2015. 
According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2016, 
China's FDI stock in Japan was US $0.30 billion 
in 2015, but China's FDI stock in the US had 
already reached US $4.08 billion the same year 
To account for this situation, it is important 
to consider Japan’s aging and low birth rate 
problems, as well as the high cost of investment 
in Japan (about 7 times that of the US), and the 
law restricting foreign investment in Japan (Zhao 
& Li, 2008 [43]; Gao, 2012 [44]). Chinese 
companies are also conservative when it comes to 
investing to Japan, so this situation cannot be 
changed in the short term. 
 Thus, these four flaws in the economic 
interdependence between China and Japan are 
almost impossible to solve in the foreseeable 
future. With the rapid growth of profit in this 
economic interdependence relationship, these 
flaws are becoming more obvious. The higher the 
profit also means the higher the trepidation of the 
loss of profit. Especially when the increasingly 
obvious flaws continue to amplify the possibility 
of recession. 
From this, we can clearly see that these 
flaws will keep on playing a negative role in the 
future of this economic interdependence 
relationship. Therefore, these flaws are one of the 
most important factors that lead to negative 
expectations in the Sino-Japanese relationship. 
This negative expectation will thus lead both 
countries into the hostile spiral. 
On the other hand, after the end of the Cold 
War, the original Planned Economy countries 
have changed into Market Economy, and trade 
liberalization and investment liberalization have 
greatly accelerated the process of globalization 
(Higher Education Press, 2010) [45]. Even with 
the rapid growth of the world market, and the 
internet and computer revolution, the impact of 
the global economic crisis has also been growing. 
More and more countries have been affected by 
the economic crisis and its associated huge 
economic losses. Apart from economic 
interdependence itself, there are other reasons that 
could cause an economic crisis between major 
powers. Simply cutting off trade or capturing the 
raw material market are no longer the main 
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reasons for the economic crisis among major 
powers after the Cold War.  
Therefore, the economic interdependence 
relationship also has a new requirement for 
maintaining sustainable profit. Simply measuring 
the growth in trade and investment cannot provide 
a comprehensive picture of economic 
interdependence. Take France and Germany as an 
example. These two are major powers in Europe, 
which also have had a long history of both 
exchange and war. They have not only 
maintained long-term peace, but also achieved 
close economic interdependence with far less 
tensions compared with the Sino-Japanese 
relationship. France and Germany have the 
coordination mechanism in many aspects, and 
eventually achieved regional economic and 
monetary integration. This reflects another 
important factor in the economic interdependence, 
which is the coordination mechanism for the two 
countries to jointly prevent risks. Serving as an 
example for both China and Japan, if the two 
countries can find a way to develop the economic 
interdependence in building the coordination 
mechanism, then tensions should be eased.  
 
3. Frustration with the establishment of the 
coordination mechanism 
In fact, the Chinese and Japanese 
governments have realized the importance of 
building the coordination mechanism since the 
late 90s. However, their efforts have not been 
successful. 
In 1997, the Asian financial turmoil swept 
across Asia. The exchange rate plummeted in 
many Asian countries and their economies 
plunged into recession. The crisis made Asian 
countries fully aware of the importance of 
building the coordination mechanism, for 
example strengthening financial cooperation, in 
order to resist the recession together.  
In May 2000, the finance ministers from 
ASEAN countries and the People's Republic of 
China, Japan, and South Korea met in Chiang 
Mai, Thailand. The ASEAN+3 finance ministers 
reached agreement on the Chiang Mai Initiative, 
which would establish a regional currency 
exchange network. In March 2002, China and 
Japan for the first time signed a swap agreement 
for US $3 billion. In 2007, the People's Bank of 
China renewed this currency swap agreement 
with the Bank of Japan. It was an important 
beginning of the financial cooperation between 
China and Japan.  
Also in 2002, the leaders at the Leadership 
Summit of China, Japan and South Korea for the 
first time put forward the idea of the 
China-Japan-ROK Free Trade Agreement [FTA]. 
If this is achieved, then a huge market of more 
than 1.5 billion people and 20% of the world's 
GDP will take an extremely important step 
towards building coordination mechanism. 
However, the progress of the FTA has not 
been as smooth as expected. The three countries 
conducted a feasibility study into the FTA, and 
had FTA negotiations up until 2012. In contrast to 
another regional free trade agreement that 
occurred in almost the same period (Trans-Pacific 
Partnership [TPP]), the process was significantly 
faster than the FTA.  
The TPP was a US-led free trade agreement, 
but intended to exclude China from the agreement. 
The United States hoped to dominate East Asia's 
trade and investment with Japan, and constrain 
the growing power of China (Yomiuri Online, 
2014) [46]. Although it might seem that the FTA 
and TPP are not opposing options, the amount of 
effort the Japanese government put into each of 
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these agreements would be in fact extremely 
sensitive for the Chinese government. In October 
2010, the Japanese government began to prepare 
for the negotiations of the TPP and signed it in 
February 2016. After that, the agreement was 
quickly passed by Congress and Japan became the 
first ratified country on 20 January 2017. 
However, the FTA stagnated and has failed to 
make any progress so far. 
Frustration has also occurred with regards to 
the monetary and financial cooperation. China 
and Japan reached a groundbreaking consensus 
on this issue in November 2011 when the 
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visited 
China. It was proposed that the two governments 
would form a consensus on promotion of a direct 
exchange between the Chinese RMB and 
Japanese Yen without passing a third currency 
(that is , the US dollar). The Japanese government 
also decided to buy Chinese bonds in this meeting. 
However, after 2011, this plan has not been 
implemented. Instead, the Japanese Finance 
Minister Matsushita Tadahiro, who actively 
promoted the financial cooperation between 
China and Japan at the time, suddenly committed 
suicide on the same day that Japanese government 
announced the nationalization of Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands (Sept. 10, 2012). Following this, the 
Chinese and Japanese governments have not 
made any progress in financial cooperation. Not 
only that, the bilateral currency swap agreement 
between China and Japan expired in 2013. Since 
then, China and Japan have been without any 
bilateral currency swap agreement. 
China and Japan suffered a huge setback on 
their efforts of building the coordination 
mechanism. This approach intended to greatly 
ease the fear of recessions for governments, but it 
did not succeed. Actually, both the Chinese and 
Japanese governments realized the flaws within 
their relationship and tried to find the solution. 
During the first decade of 21st century, the 
Sino-Japanese relationship was seriously affected 
by these two factors: the increasingly obvious 
flaws on the one hand and the effort of both 
governments to build the coordination mechanism 
on the other hand. These two factors working 
together have led to the repeated unstable 
situation between China and Japan in the 2000s. 
Also, due to the exacerbating flaws and the 
frustration with the establishment of the 
coordination mechanism around 2012, negative 
expectations have completely become mainstream 
in this relationship. This can explain the reason 
behind the escalating tensions between China and 
Japan. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper has reviewed arguments of 
different theories concerning the relationship 
between economic interdependence and conflict. 
No matter liberalism, realism or Copeland's trade 
expectations theory, all have shown the important 
impact of economic factors in international 
relations and policy changes. Among the 
aforementioned theories, Copeland's trade 
expectations theory can better grasp the dynamics 
of international relations, and give a logically 
coherent interpretation to explain the reasons 
behind policy changes (for both peace and 
conflict) in a long period of time. 
However, if we look deeper into the case of 
the Sino-Japanese relationship, we will see that 
the trade expectations theory still cannot explain 
the situation between China and Japan since the 
late 90s, especially for the escalating tensions in 
recent years. This is not only because of the 
 
 
 
ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies Vol.11 (1) 2018 
 
 91 
particularity of the economic interdependence 
relationship between China and Japan, but also 
the theoretical disadvantage of the trade 
expectations theory. In the context of accelerated 
economic globalization, coordination mechanism 
became a new requirement for maintain 
sustainable profit of the economic 
interdependence. 
In the third section of this paper, I 
highlighted four flaws in the economic 
interdependence relationship between China and 
Japan. This was done to demonstrate the 
development of this relationship, as well as to 
emphasize the importance influence of flaws in 
the economic interdependence. When economic 
interdependence has obvious flaws, the 
importance of building the coordination 
mechanism is even more pronounced.  
The flaws and the coordination mechanism 
are the most critical factors that affect 
governments’ expectations. Especially in the case 
of Sino-Japanese relationship, which flaws are 
almost impossible to solve in the foreseeable 
future, the establishment of the coordination 
mechanism is the decisive choice for both China 
and Japan in order to maintain the sustainability 
of profit for this economic interdependence. 
However, after a period of different efforts, China 
and Japan have not succeeded in this approach. 
For this reason, negative expectations between 
these two countries led to the current situation of 
escalating tensions. 
I used the case of the Sino-Japanese 
relationship, which is one of the most important 
relations between big powers, to demonstrate the 
argument of the link between economic 
interdependence and conflict. I also tried to 
answer the question of the escalating tensions 
using one argument for different periods of this 
relationship. I found that using the dynamic 
perspective which Copeland proposed in the trade 
expectations theory and re-examining the 
economic interdependence can provide a logically 
consistent explanation to this case.   
However, this paper cannot answer the 
question of what was the starting point for this 
spiral of conflict. Which side, whether China or 
Japan, was the first to be aware of the flaws of 
this economic interdependence? Whether it was 
China or Japan, would either change their 
behavior and trigger the spiral of conflict?  
Therefore, the exact cause and exact time 
that lead both countries into the hostile spiral is 
vague. This paper, from only a macro point of 
view, examined the economic interdependence 
and the dynamic of escalating tensions between 
China and Japan. As this paper focused on the 
contemporary relations, most diplomatic files are 
not yet available to the public. I hope that the case 
of the Sino-Japanese relationship can propose an 
explanation of the link between economic 
interdependence and the relations of the major 
powers. Future studies can go beyond the 
Sino-Japanese relationship, and use this idea to 
verify the relations of other big powers. Of course, 
the relationship between China and Japan itself is 
very complex, involving many actors, even other 
great powers like the United States, Russia, and 
so on. Even though I believe that the commercial 
factor plays the most important in this relationship, 
the influence of other factors still cannot be 
denied. Due to the limitations of the paper, these 
questions cannot be answered, so this is left to 
future research to pursue. 
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Footnote＊ 
 
1 Graduate School of International Development, 
Nagoya university. 
2 Mearsheimer [14]. 
3 There is no strict definition for the concept of 
‘Cold Politics and Hot Economy’, but rather it is 
more like a widely held assumption within 
academia. Jin Xide firstly used this concept in 
1997, in the magazine China Campus (Zhongguo 
daxuesheng), No. 9, p. 32. After that, this concept 
has been widely used in Sino-Japanese relations 
academia to describe the situation in the first 
decade of the 2000s. 
4 Copeland [1]. 
5 Copeland [1]. 
6 LT Trade refers to the semi-official trade basis on 
the ‘Sino-Japanese comprehensive long-term 
trade memo’ between the People's Republic of 
China and Japan since 1962. The two countries 
used government-guaranteed funds for trade even 
though they did not have formal diplomatic 
relations. This has been referred to as the ‘LT 
Trade’ whose name derives from the Chinese 
representative Liao (‘L’) Chengzhi and the 
Japanese representative Tatsunosuke 
Takazaki(‘T’) . 
7 Tanaka [22]. 
8 Drysdale [2]. 
9 Song & Tian [23.] 
10 Tanaka [22]. 
11 Tanaka [22]. 
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